Related papers: Self-Enforced Job Matching
In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed as compromises between both sides of the market. These…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
This paper considers two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (worker or doctor). In a standard model, while multiple doctors can be matched to a…
We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we…
Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large…
The recruitment process is a slow and inefficient one at best, and a potentially ineffective one at worst. Matching candidates to jobs is one thing, but matching candidates with jobs alongside appropriate expectations and taking into…
Employers are adopting algorithmic hiring technology throughout the recruitment pipeline. Algorithmic fairness is especially applicable in this domain due to its high stakes and structural inequalities. Unfortunately, most work in this…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
This paper studies decentralized re-equilibration following population shocks, such as worker exits or firm entries, in many-to-many matching markets with contracts under substitutable preferences. We show that restricting any pre-shock…
Wage dispersion and job-to-job mobility are central features of modern labour markets, yet canonical equilibrium search models with exogenous job-offer ladders struggle to jointly account for these facts and the magnitude of frictional wage…
Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability…
We study competition between firms in labor markets, following a combinatorial model suggested by Kelso and Crawford [1982]. In this model, each firm is trying to recruit workers by offering a higher salary than its competitors, and its…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = \left( A \cup B, E \right)$. In the one-sided model, every $a \in A$ (often called agents) ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and no $b \in B$ has any preference order over its neighbours $y \in…
We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we investigate a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem where…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…