Related papers: On Incentivizing Social Information Sharing Throug…
We design a coordination mechanism for truck drivers that uses pricing-and-routing schemes that can help alleviate traffic congestion in a general transportation network. We consider the user heterogeneity in Value-Of-Time (VOT) by adopting…
A smartphone user's personal hotspot (pH) allows him to share cellular connection to another (e.g., a traveler) in the vicinity, but such sharing consumes the limited data quota in his two-part tariff plan and may lead to overage charge.…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
When people choose routes minimizing their individual delay, the aggregate congestion can be much higher compared to that experienced by a centrally-imposed routing. Yet centralized routing is incompatible with the presence of…
We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a well-established game-theoretic concept to shed light on coordination issues arising in open distributed systems. Leaving agents to selfishly optimize comes with the risk of ending up in sub-optimal states…
Today many mobile users in various zones are invited to sense and send back real-time useful information (e.g., traffic observation and sensor data) to keep the freshness of the content updates in such zones. However, due to the sampling…
Overcoming the impact of selfish behavior of rational players in multiagent systems is a fundamental problem in game theory. Without any intervention from a central agent, strategic users take actions in order to maximize their personal…
We consider a fundamental game theoretic problem concerning selfish users contributing packets to an M/M/1 queue. In this game, each user controls its own input rate so as to optimize a desired tradeoff between throughput and delay. We…
We consider the min-cost multicast problem (under network coding) with multiple correlated sources where each terminal wants to losslessly reconstruct all the sources. We study the inefficiency brought forth by the selfish behavior of the…
The effective design and management of public transport systems are essential to ensure the best service for users. The performance of a transport system will depend heavily on user behaviour. In the common-lines problem approach, users…
We investigate the behavior of a large number of selfish users that are able to switch dynamically between multiple wireless access-points (possibly belonging to different standards) by introducing an iterated non-cooperative game. Users…
Incentive design constitutes a foundational paradigm for influencing the behavior of strategic agents, wherein a system planner (principal) publicly commits to an incentive mechanism designed to align individual objectives with collective…
In many wireless communication networks a common channel is shared by multiple users who must compete to gain access to it. The operation of the network by self-interested and strategic users usually leads to the overuse of the channel…
We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or…
Considering congestion games with uncertain delays, we compute the inefficiency introduced in network routing by risk-averse agents. At equilibrium, agents may select paths that do not minimize the expected latency so as to obtain lower…
We consider the problem of designing the the utility functions of the utility-maximizing agents in a multi-agent system so that they work synergistically to maximize a global utility. The particular problem domain we explore is the control…
Despite the increasing popularity and successful examples of crowdsourcing, it is stripped of aureole when collective efforts are derailed or severely hindered by elaborate sabotage. A service exchange dilemma arises when non-cooperation…
Increasingly large trip demands have strained urban transportation capacity, which consequently leads to traffic congestion and rapid growth of greenhouse gas emissions. In this work, we focus on achieving sustainable transportation by…
Previous work has shown that when multiple selfish Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are introduced to future cities and start learning optimal routing strategies using Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), they may destabilize traffic…