Related papers: Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate Loca…
This paper studies a practical regional demand continuous multifacility location problems whose main goal is to locate a given number of services and entry points in each region to distribute certain products to the users at minimum…
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of…
We consider the facility location problem in two dimensions. In particular, we consider a setting where agents have Euclidean preferences, defined by their ideal points, for a facility to be located in $\mathbb{R}^2$. We show that for the…
This paper explores the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem where the total facility capacity is less than the number of agents. Following the framework outlined by Aziz et al., the Social Welfare of…
We consider a two-stage robust facility location problem on a metric under an uncertain demand. The decision-maker needs to decide on the (integral) units of supply for each facility in the first stage to satisfy an uncertain second-stage…
This paper deals with a bilevel approach of the location-allocation problem with dimensional facilities. We present a general model that allows us to consider very general shapes of domains for the dimensional facilities and we prove the…
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating a set of items among strategic agents with additive valuations, where items are either all indivisible or all divisible. When items are goods, numerous positive and negative results…
In this paper, we provide a rigorous theoretical investigation of an online learning version of the Facility Location problem which is motivated by emerging problems in real-world applications. In our formulation, we are given a set of…
Location Routing is a fundamental planning problem in logistics, in which strategic location decisions on the placement of facilities (depots, distribution centers, warehouses etc.) are taken based on accurate estimates of operational…
We study a variant of the competitive facility location problem, in which a company is to locate new facilities in a market where competitor's facilities already exist. We consider the scenario where only a limited number of possible…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…
To successfully navigate its environment, an agent must construct and maintain representations of the other agents that it encounters. Such representations are useful for many tasks, but they are not without cost. As a result, agents must…
In this work we introduce an alternative model for the design and analysis of strategyproof mechanisms that is motivated by the recent surge of work in "learning-augmented algorithms". Aiming to complement the traditional approach in…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
We studied the Fault-Tolerant Facility Placement problem (FTFP) which generalizes the uncapacitated facility location problem (UFL). In FTFP, we are given a set F of sites at which facilities can be built, and a set C of clients with some…
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purchase a feasible solution by conducting an auction. Our goal is…
We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice,…