Related papers: The structure of strategy-proof rules

We examine hypothesis testing within a principal-agent framework, where a strategic agent, holding private beliefs about the effectiveness of a product, submits data to a principal who decides on approval. The principal employs a hypothesis…

This paper is part of an emerging line of work at the intersection of machine learning and mechanism design, which aims to avoid noise in training data by correctly aligning the incentives of data sources. Specifically, we focus on the…

Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice…

Recommendation systems are pervasive in the digital economy. An important assumption in many deployed systems is that user consumption reflects user preferences in a static sense: users consume the content they like with no other…

We conduct an incentivized lab experiment to test participants' ability to understand the DA matching mechanism and the strategyproofness property, conveyed in different ways. We find that while many participants can (using a novel GUI)…

While there are many approaches for automatically proving termination of term rewrite systems, up to now there exist only few techniques to disprove their termination automatically. Almost all of these techniques try to find loops, where…

We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked…

We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or…

A policy is said to be robust if it maximizes the reward while considering a bad, or even adversarial, model. In this work we formalize two new criteria of robustness to action uncertainty. Specifically, we consider two scenarios in which…

This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…

Consider the following process on a network: Each agent initially holds either opinion blue or red; then, in each round, each agent looks at two random neighbors and, if the two have the same opinion, the agent adopts it. This process is…

We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…

Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting…

A planner aims to target individuals who exceed a threshold in a characteristic, such as wealth or ability. The individuals can rank their friends according to the characteristic. We study a strategy-proof mechanism for the planner to use…

We consider the problem of decision-making using panel data, in which a decision-maker gets noisy, repeated measurements of multiple units (or agents). We consider a setup where there is a pre-intervention period, when the principal…

We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…

Many large-scale recommender systems consist of two stages. The first stage efficiently screens the complete pool of items for a small subset of promising candidates, from which the second-stage model curates the final recommendations. In…

A preference domain is called a non-dictatorial domain if it allows the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. We study a class of preference domains called…

This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly's preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements of the former…

In this note, we study a class of stochastic control problems where the optimal strategies are described by two parameters. These include a subset of singular control, impulse control, and two-player stochastic games. The parameters are…