Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default
Theoretical Economics
2026-03-19 v1
Abstract
We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or a "none of the above" stance within the decision process. We study this augmented single-peaked domain. On this domain, we characterize the class of rules called target rules with a default. We show that onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness characterize this class of rules.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2603.17772,
title = {Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default},
author = {Parikshit De and Abinash Panda and Anup Pramanik},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2603.17772},
year = {2026}
}