Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domains
Theoretical Economics
2022-01-05 v2
Abstract
We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the preferences are single-peaked at the "extremes" and unrestricted in the "middle". We also study the structure of strategy-proof and unanimous Random Social Choice Functions on these domains. We show them to be special cases of probabilistic fixed ballot rules (introduced by Ehlers, Peters, and Storcken (2002)).
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2105.10677,
title = {Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domains},
author = {Shurojit Chatterji and Souvik Roy and Soumyarup Sadhukhan and Arunava Sen and Huaxia Zeng},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.10677},
year = {2022}
}