Related papers: Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domain…
This paper contains an extensive combinatorial analysis of the single-peaked domain restriction and investigates the likelihood that an election is single-peaked. We provide a very general upper bound result for domain restrictions that can…
A preference domain is called a non-dictatorial domain if it allows the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. We study a class of preference domains called…
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…
A preferential domain is a collection of sets of preferences which are linear orders over a set of alternatives. These domains have been studied extensively in social choice theory due to both its practical importance and theoretical…
We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or…
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked…
Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…
In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…
An ordinal preference domain is a subset of preference orders that the voters are allowed to cast in an election. We introduce and study the notion of outer diversity of a domain and evaluate its value for a number of well-known structured…
We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional…
We investigate the connections between patterns in permutations and forbidden configurations in restricted elections, first discovered by Lackner and Lackner, in order to enhance the approach initiated by the two mentioned authors. More…
This paper characterizes the single-peaked domain on a tree via the strategy-proofness of extreme rules defined on that tree. For any tree, these rules are unanimous and anonymous on any preference domain. In particular, we show that they…
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…
Single-peakedness is one of the most important and well-known domain restrictions on preferences. The computational study of single-peaked electorates has largely been restricted to elections with tie-free votes, and recent work that…
In this paper, we study voting rules on the interval domain, where the alternatives are arranged according to an externally given strict total order and voters report intervals of this order to indicate the alternatives they support. For…
McFadden and Richter (1991) and later McFadden (2005) show that the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference characterizes rationalizability of choice probabilities through random utility models on finite universal choice spaces. This note…
Single-peaked preferences and domains are extensively researched in social science and economics. In this study, we examine the interval property as well as combinatorial structure of single-peaked preferences on a fixed Left-Right social…
We define the Probability of Tiered Benefit in scenarios with a binary exposure and an outcome that is either categorical with $K \geq 2$ ordered tiers or continuous partitioned by $K-1$ fixed thresholds into disjoint intervals. Similarly…
Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context of traditional non-probabilistic social choice, these…