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Eliciting the preferences of a set of agents over a set of alternatives is a problem of fundamental importance in social choice theory. Prior work on this problem has studied the query complexity of preference elicitation for the…
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility on a line in a society where agents have either single-peaked or single-dipped preferences. We consider the domain analyzed in Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2024), where the type of preference of…
This paper derives primitive, easily verifiable sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of (stochastic) recursive utilities for several important classes of preferences. In order to accommodate models commonly used in practice,…
We provide novel simple representations of strategy-proof voting rules when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences (as well as multi-dimensional separable preferences). The analysis recovers, links and unifies existing…
Probabilistic programming languages (PPLs) are expressive means for creating and reasoning about probabilistic models. Unfortunately hybrid probabilistic programs, involving both continuous and discrete structures, are not well supported by…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
Symplectic billiards were introduced by Albers and Tabachnikov as billiards in strictly convex bounded domains of the plane with smooth boundary having a specific law of reflection. This paper proves a rigidity result for symplectic…
We develop an algorithm for computing bounded reachability probability for hybrid systems, i.e., the probability that the system reaches an unsafe region within a finite number of discrete transitions. In particular, we focus on hybrid…
Motivated by a problem of scheduling unit-length jobs with weak preferences over time-slots, the random assignment problem (also called the house allocation problem) is considered on a uniform preference domain. For the subdomain in which…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
Two distinct specifications of single peakedness as currently met in the relevant literature are singled out and discussed. Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications, a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive…
In random expected utility (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006), the distribution of preferences is uniquely recoverable from random choice. This paper shows through two examples that such uniqueness fails in general if risk preferences are random…
The purpose of this note is to prove the existence of a randomized mechanism, a social decision scheme (SDS), with desirable fairness, efficiency, and strategyproofness properties unmatched by all known SDSs. In particular, we disprove a…
Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations arising in voting theory: regarding their permutations as preference orders on a list of candidates, one avoids Condorcet's paradox when aggregating the preferences via a simple majority…
The boundary of the lemon billiards is defined by the intersection of two circles of equal unit radius with the distance 2B between their centers, as introduced by Heller and Tomsovic in Phys. Today 46 38 (1993). We study two classical and…
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…
This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly's preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements of the former…
Conjoint experiments randomize multidimensional profiles, offering a powerful design for recovering structural preference parameters -- including marginal rates of substitution, willingness to pay, and the distribution of preferences across…