Related papers: The structure of strategy-proof rules
Existing approaches to coalition formation often assume that requirements associated with tasks are precisely specified by the human operator. However, prior work has demonstrated that humans, while extremely adept at solving complex…
We present an iterative algorithm for enforcing policies represented in a first-order logic, which can, in particular, express all transmission-related clauses in the HIPAA Privacy Rule. The logic has three features that raise challenges…
We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to…
Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual preferences are strict. We show that no extension of random dictatorship to weak preferences…
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice…
We study a model of consensus decision making, in which a finite group of Bayesian agents has to choose between one of two courses of action. Each member of the group has a private and independent signal at his or her disposal, giving some…
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…
We present a method for using standard techniques from satisfiability checking to automatically verify and discover theorems in an area of economic theory known as ranking sets of objects. The key question in this area, which has important…
Many biological, psychological and economic experiments have been designed where an organism or individual must choose between two options that have the same expected reward but differ in the variance of reward received. In this way,…
A network growth mechanism based on a two-step preferential rule is investigated as a model of network growth in which no global knowledge of the network is required. In the first filtering step a subset of fixed size $m$ of existing nodes…
PRholog is an experimental extension of logic programming with strategic conditional transformation rules, combining Prolog with Rholog calculus. The rules perform nondeterministic transformations on hedges. Queries may have several results…
Existing decision-theoretic reasoning frameworks such as decision networks use simple data structures and processes. However, decisions are often made based on complex data structures, such as social networks and protein sequences, and rich…
Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) form a prominent model for uncertainty in sequential decision making. We are interested in constructing algorithms with theoretical guarantees to determine whether the agent has a…
Borgs et al. [2016] investigated essential requirements for communities in preference networks. They defined six axioms on community functions, i.e., community detection rules. Though having elegant properties, the practicality of this…
We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…
A social choice procedure is modeled as a repeated Nash game between the social agents, who are communicating with each other through a social communication network modeled by an undirected graph. The agents' criteria for this game are…
In social learning, a network of agents assigns probability scores (beliefs) to some hypotheses of interest, which rule the generation of local streaming data observed by each agent. Belief formation takes place by means of an iterative…
Cut-elimination is the bedrock of proof theory. It is the algorithm that eliminates cuts from a sequent calculus proof that leads to cut-free calculi and applications. Cut-elimination applies to many logics irrespective of their semantics.…
We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such a setting, we have a set of agents and a set of facilities. Each agent is located on a line and has an ordinal preference over the facilities. Our goal…
In complex tasks where the reward function is not straightforward and consists of a set of objectives, multiple reinforcement learning (RL) policies that perform task adequately, but employ different strategies can be trained by adjusting…