Related papers: First Price Auction is $1-1/e^2$ Efficient

Since 2019, most ad exchanges and sell-side platforms (SSPs), in the online advertising industry, shifted from second to first price auctions. Due to the fundamental difference between these auctions, demand-side platforms (DSPs) have had…

We model a procurement scenario in which two \textit{imperfect} bidders act simultaneously on behalf of a single buyer, a configuration common in display advertising and referred to as \textit{side-by-side bidding} but largely unexplored in…

The remaining min-entropy of a secret generated by fuzzy extraction from a Physical Unclonable Function is typically estimated under the assumption of independent and identically distributed PUF responses, but this assumption does not hold…

We study the Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium (BCCE) of continuous and discretised first-price and all-pay auctions under the standard symmetric independent private-values model. Our study is motivated by the question of how the…

We study the problem of computing data-driven personalized reserve prices in eager second price auctions without having any assumption on valuation distributions. Here, the input is a data-set that contains the submitted bids of $n$ buyers…

We propose a new nonparametric estimator for first-price auctions with independent private values that imposes the monotonicity constraint on the estimated inverse bidding strategy. We show that our estimator has a smaller asymptotic…

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from…

Suppose you have one unit of stock, currently worth 1, which you must sell before time $T$. The Optional Sampling Theorem tells us that whatever stopping time we choose to sell, the expected discounted value we get when we sell will be 1.…

We prove a lower bound on the first eigenvalue of the fractional Dirichlet-Laplacian of order $s$ on planar open sets, in terms of their inradius and topology. The result is optimal, in many respects. In particular, we recover a classical…

In this paper, we consider option pricing in a framework of the fractional Heston-type model with $H>1/2$. As it is impossible to obtain an explicit formula for the expectation $\mathbb E f(S_T)$ in this case, where $S_T$ is the asset price…

Let $\alpha$ be a real number greater than $1$. We establish an effective lower bound for the distance between an integral power of $\alpha$ and its nearest integer.

We study fairness in the context of feature-based price discrimination in monopoly markets. We propose a new notion of individual fairness, namely, \alpha-fairness, which guarantees that individuals with similar features face similar…

Learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions is a fundamental problem at the interface of game theory and machine learning, which has seen a recent surge in interest due to the transition of display advertising to first-price auctions.…

Motivated by large-market applications such as crowdsourcing, we revisit the problem of budget-feasible mechanism design under a "small-bidder assumption". Anari, Goel, and Nikzad (2018) gave a mechanism that has optimal competitive ratio…

Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling…

We consider the computation for allocations of indivisible chores that are approximately EFX and Pareto optimal (PO). Recently, Garg et al. (2024) show the existence of $3$-EFX and PO allocations for bi-valued instances, where the cost of…

In many auctions, bidders may be reluctant to reveal private information to the auctioneer and other bidders. Among deterministic bilateral communication protocols, reducing what bidders learn requires increasing what the auctioneer learns.…

The declining price anomaly states that the price weakly decreases when multiple copies of an item are sold sequentially over time. The anomaly has been observed in a plethora of practical applications. On the theoretical side, Gale and…

This paper studies equilibrium quality of semi-separable position auctions (known as the Ad Types setting) with greedy or optimal allocation combined with generalized second-price (GSP) or Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) pricing. We make three…

Using rigorous high-precision floating point arithmetic we compute very tight rigorous bounds on the auto-convolution constant \[ \nu_2^2 = \inf_f \|f \ast f\|_2^2 = \inf_f \int_{-1}^1 (f \ast f)^2 \] where the infimum is taken over all…