Related papers: First Price Auction is $1-1/e^2$ Efficient
This paper addresses the question of how much to bid to maximize the profit when trading in two electricity markets: the hourly Day-Ahead Auction and the quarter-hourly Intraday Auction. For optimal coordinated bidding many price scenarios…
This work focuses on the design of taxes in atomic congestion games, a commonly studied model for competitive resource sharing. While most related studies focus on optimizing either the worst- or best-case performance (i.e., Price of…
A seller with one unit of a good faces N\geq3 buyers and a single competitor who sells one other identical unit in a second-price auction with a reserve price. Buyers who do not get the seller's good will compete in the competitor's…
We derive two probabilistic bounds for the relative forward error in the floating point summation of $n$ real numbers, by representing the roundoffs as independent, zero-mean, bounded random variables. The first probabilistic bound is based…
We consider a solution $u(\cdot,t)$ to an initial boundary value problem for time-fractional diffusion-wave equation with the order $\alpha \in (0,2) \setminus \{ 1\}$ where $t$ is a time variable. We first prove that a suitable norm of…
In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typically measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source for such a distribution is past data. The goal is to understand…
The internet advertising market is a multi-billion dollar industry, in which advertisers buy thousands of ad placements every day by repeatedly participating in auctions. An important and ubiquitous feature of these auctions is the presence…
In a classical model of the first-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values, we develop nonparametric estimators for several policy-relevant targets, such as the bidder's surplus and auctioneer's revenue under counterfactual…
This paper examines the impact of agents' myopic optimization on the efficiency of systems comprised by many selfish agents. In contrast to standard congestion games where agents interact in a one-shot fashion, in our model each agent…
We study first passage statistics of the Polya urn model. In this random process, the urn contains two types of balls. In each step, one ball is drawn randomly from the urn, and subsequently placed back into the urn together with an…
We give an improved lower bound for the error of any quadrature computing $\int_{-1}^1 f(x) d\alpha(x)$ of analytic functions bounded in the neighborhood of $[-1,1]$.
We study the performance of anonymous posted-price selling mechanisms for a standard Bayesian auction setting, where $n$ bidders have i.i.d. valuations for a single item. We show that for the natural class of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR)…
The goal of an auction is to determine commodity prices such that all participants are perfectly happy. Such a solution is called a competitive equilibrium and does not exist in general. For this reason we are interested in solutions which…
A Lookahead Auction (LA), introduced by Ronen, is an auction format for the sale of a single item among multiple buyers, which is considered simpler and more fair than the optimal auction. Indeed, it anonymously selects a provisional winner…
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a standard metric for quantifying inefficiency in socio-technical systems, widely used to guide policies like traffic tolling. Conventional PoA analysis relies on exact numerical costs. However, in many…
We improve the best known competitive ratio (from 1/4 to 1/2), for the online multi-unit allocation problem, where the objective is to maximize the single-price revenue. Moreover, the competitive ratio of our algorithm tends to 1, as the…
A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue properties. In this setting, the bidders' valuations for the items are private knowledge, but they are drawn from publicly known prior distributions. The goal is to…
When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two…
We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-maximizing auction design literature as it requires no…
We study the optimal placement of advertisements for interactive platforms like conversational AI assistants. Importantly, conversations add a feature absent in canonical search markets -- time. The evolution of a conversation is…