Related papers: First Price Auction is $1-1/e^2$ Efficient
We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in…
We study the fair division of indivisible items with subsidies among $n$ agents, where the absolute marginal valuation of each item is at most one. Under monotone valuations (where each item is a good), Brustle et al. (2020) demonstrated…
We give an auction for downward-closed environments that generalizes the random sampling profit extraction auction for digital goods of Fiat et al. (2002). The mechanism divides the agents in to a market and a sample using a biased coin and…
We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximations of the optimal revenue in the worst case. We show that the optimal mechanism…
We provide the first analysis of (deferred acceptance) clock auctions in the learning-augmented framework. These auctions satisfy a unique list of appealing properties, including obvious strategyproofness, transparency, and unconditional…
We study revenue variance in the sale of $k$ homogeneous items to risk-neutral, unit-demand bidders with independent private values. Although the Revenue Equivalence Theorem implies that standard auctions generate the same expected revenue,…
We study how a budget-constrained bidder should learn to adaptively bid in repeated first-price auctions to maximize her cumulative payoff. This problem arose due to an industry-wide shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions…
With the advent and increasing consolidation of e-commerce, digital advertising has very recently replaced traditional advertising as the main marketing force in the economy. In the past four years, a particularly important development in…
We study the two-agent single-item bilateral trade. Ideally, the trade should happen whenever the buyer's value for the item exceeds the seller's cost. However, the classical result of Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that no mechanism can…
A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…
Let $E$ be an elliptic curve over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$ where $q$ is a prime power. The Schoof--Elkies--Atkin (SEA) algorithm is a standard method for counting the number of $\mathbb{F}_q$-points on $E$. The asymptotic complexity of…
Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving…
In settings where players have a limited access to liquidity, represented in the form of budget constraints, efficiency maximization has proven to be a challenging goal. In particular, the social welfare cannot be approximated by a better…
We examine the complexity of computing welfare- and revenue-maximizing equilibria in autobidding second-price auctions subject to return-on-spend (RoS) constraints. We show that computing an autobidding equilibrium that approximates the…
We formulate the problem of fair and efficient completion of indivisible goods, defined as follows: Given a partial allocation of indivisible goods among agents, does there exist an allocation of the remaining goods (i.e., a completion)…
Let $p_n$ be the $n$th prime, and consider the sequence $s_n = (2\cdot3\cdots p_n)^{1/n} = (p_n\#)^{1/n}$, the geometric mean of the first $n$ primes. We give a short proof that $p_n/s_n \to e$, a result conjectured by Vrba (2010) and…
We study actual bidding behavior when a new auction format gets introduced into the marketplace. More specifically, we investigate this question using a novel dataset on internet display advertising auctions that exploits a staggered…
Floors (also known as reserve prices) help publishers to increase the expected revenue of their ad space, which is usually sold via auctions. Floors are defined as the minimum bid that a seller (it can be a publisher or an ad exchange) is…
We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and economically efficient…
The problem of finding an optimum using noisy evaluations of a smooth cost function arises in many contexts, including economics, business, medicine, experiment design, and foraging theory. We derive an asymptotic bound E[ (x_t - x*)^2 ] >=…