Related papers: On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuat…
The fair allocation of mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, has been a prominent topic of study in economics and computer science. We define an allocation as fair if its utility vector minimizes a symmetric…
We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any…
We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1): strong,…
We consider the problem of allocating a set of divisible goods to $N$ agents in an online manner, aiming to maximize the Nash social welfare, a widely studied objective which provides a balance between fairness and efficiency. The goods…
We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a market mechanism, focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. The majority of the economics and mechanism design literature has focused on \emph{linear} prices, meaning…
We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that each agent has i.i.d. values for the item across rounds, and…
We consider a simple sequential allocation procedure for sharing indivisible items between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. Supposing additive utilities and independence between the agents, we show that the expected utility…
Many multiagent systems rely on collective decision-making among self-interested agents, which raises deep questions about coalition formation and stability. We study social choice with endogenous, outcome-contingent transfers, where agents…
We study the problem of assigning items to agents so as to maximize the \emph{weighted} Nash Social Welfare (NSW) under submodular valuations. The best-known result for the problem is an $O(nw_{\max})$-approximation due to Garg, Husic, Li,…
We consider the problem of allocating multiple indivisible items to a set of networked agents to maximize the social welfare subject to network externalities. Here, the social welfare is given by the sum of agents' utilities and…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to agents with additive utilities to maximize the Nash social welfare. Cole and Gkatzelis recently proved that this problem admits a constant factor approximation. We complement…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items on a path among agents. The objective is to find a fair and efficient allocation in which each agent's bundle forms a contiguous block on the line. We say that an instance is \emph{$(a,…
A number of goods are called identical if they provide the same level of utility to each agent. In various real-world instances of fair division scenarios, identical indivisible items are allocated to consumers and demandants with different…
In this paper, we present new results on the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods to agents whose preferences correspond to {\em matroid rank functions}. This is a versatile valuation class with several desirable properties…
We study the online allocation of divisible items to $n$ agents with additive valuations for $p$-mean welfare maximization, a problem introduced by Barman, Khan, and Maiti~(2022). Our algorithmic and hardness results characterize the…
For any $\varepsilon>0$, we give a simple, deterministic $(4+\varepsilon)$-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem under submodular valuations. We also consider the asymmetric variant of the problem, where the…
We initiate the study of indivisible chore allocation for agents with asymmetric shares. The fairness concept we focus on is the weighted natural generalization of maxmin share: WMMS fairness and OWMMS fairness. We first highlight the fact…
We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this…
We study the question of dividing a collection of indivisible goods amongst a set of agents. The main objective of research in the area is to achieve one of two goals: fairness or efficiency. On the fairness side, envy-freeness is the…
We investigate optimal social welfare allocations of $m$ items to $n$ agents with binary additive or submodular valuations. For binary additive valuations, we prove that the set of optimal allocations coincides with the set of so-called…