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APX-Hardness of Maximizing Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items

Computational Complexity 2015-07-07 v1 Data Structures and Algorithms Computer Science and Game Theory

Abstract

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to agents with additive utilities to maximize the Nash social welfare. Cole and Gkatzelis recently proved that this problem admits a constant factor approximation. We complement their result by showing that this problem is APX-hard.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1507.01159,
  title  = {APX-Hardness of Maximizing Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items},
  author = {Euiwoong Lee},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.01159},
  year   = {2015}
}

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6 pages