Related papers: Mechanism Design with Informational Punishment

Recently, there has been a number of papers relating mechanism design and privacy (e.g., see \cite{MT07,Xia11,CCKMV11,NST12,NOS12,HK12}). All of these papers consider a worst-case setting where there is no probabilistic information about…

We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…

We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after…

We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…

Information disclosure can compromise privacy when revealed information is correlated with private information. We consider the notion of inferential privacy, which measures privacy leakage by bounding the inferential power a Bayesian…

We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…

We propose definitions of substitutes and complements for pieces of information ("signals") in the context of a decision or optimization problem, with game-theoretic and algorithmic applications. In a game-theoretic context, substitutes…

A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or persuasion -- looks to improve equilibria by providing…

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…

We study security threats to Markov games due to information asymmetry and misinformation. We consider an attacker player who can spread misinformation about its reward function to influence the robust victim player's behavior. Given a…

We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…

We present an approach for systematically anticipating the actions and policies employed by \emph{oblivious} environments in concurrent stochastic games, while maximizing a reward function. Our main contribution lies in the synthesis of a…

A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…

We present a general framework for evolutionary learning to emergent unbiased state representation without any supervision. Evolutionary frameworks such as self-play converge to bad local optima in case of multi-agent reinforcement learning…

Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of…

The distribution of efficient individuals in the economy and the efforts that they will put in if they are hired, there are two important concerns for a technologically advanced firm. wants to open a new branch. The firm does not have…

We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a…

There are many familiar situations in which a manager seeks to design a system in which users share a resource, but outcomes depend on the information held and actions taken by users. If communication is possible, the manager can ask users…

A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…

Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…