Related papers: Mechanism Design with Informational Punishment

In this work, we investigate a steering problem in a mediator-augmented two-player normal-form game, where the mediator aims to guide players toward a specific action profile through information and incentive design. We first characterize…

In the setting where information cannot be verified, we propose a simple yet powerful information theoretical framework---the Mutual Information Paradigm---for information elicitation mechanisms. Our framework pays every agent a measure of…

Incentive design deals with interaction between a principal and an agent where the former can shape the latter's utility through a policy commitment. It is well known that the principal faces an information rent when dealing with an agent…

Firms and statistical agencies must protect the privacy of the individuals whose data they collect, analyze, and publish. Increasingly, these organizations do so by using publication mechanisms that satisfy differential privacy. We consider…

Many biological regulatory systems process signals out of steady state and respond with a physiological delay. A simple model of regulation which respects these features shows how the ability of a delayed output to transmit information is…

In this paper, we present a resource allocation mechanism for the problem of incentivizing filtering among a finite number of strategic social media platforms. We consider the presence of a strategic government and private knowledge of how…

Mutual information has been successfully adopted in filter feature-selection methods to assess both the relevancy of a subset of features in predicting the target variable and the redundancy with respect to other variables. However,…

In competitive games with private objectives, actions can reveal information about hidden parameters. Quantifying such information revelation, however, is substantially more challenging, since it depends not only on the opponent's hidden…

We study the classic mechanism design problem of locating a public facility on a real line. In contrast to previous work, we assume that the agents are unable to fully specify where their preferred location lies, and instead only provide…

We study how a principal can jointly shape an agent's timing and action through information. We develop a revelation principle: with intertemporal commitment, the problem simplifies to choosing a joint distribution over stopping times and…

Information exchange systems differ in many ways, but all share a common vulnerability to selfish behavior and free-riding. In this paper, we build incentives schemes based on social norms. Social norms prescribe a social strategy for the…

Classic mechanism/information design imposes the assumption that agents are fully rational, meaning each of them always selects the action that maximizes her expected utility. Yet many empirical evidence suggests that human decisions may…

In order to transmit biochemical signals, biological regulatory systems dissipate energy with concomitant entropy production. Additionally, signaling often takes place in challenging environmental conditions. In a simple model regulatory…

We study a sequential mechanism design problem in which a principal seeks to elicit truthful reports from multiple rational agents while starting with no prior knowledge of agents' beliefs. We introduce Distributionally Robust Adaptive…

We consider a finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic system jointly controlled by a designer and one or more agents, where the designer can influence the agents' actions through selective information disclosure. At each time step, the…

We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…

This paper reports experimental data describing the dynamics of three key information-sharing outcomes: quantity of information shared, falsification and accuracy. The experimental design follows a formal model predicting that cooperative…

A powerful feature in mechanism design is the ability to irrevocably commit to the rules of a mechanism. Commitment is achieved by public declaration, which enables players to verify incentive properties in advance and the outcome in…

This paper studies dynamic mechanism design in a quasilinear Markovian environment and analyzes a direct mechanism model of a principal-agent framework in which the agent is allowed to exit at any period. We consider that the agent's…

This paper initiates a discussion of mechanism design when the participating agents exhibit preferences that deviate from expected utility theory (EUT). In particular, we consider mechanism design for systems where the agents are modeled as…