Related papers: Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets

Interaction nets are a form of restricted graph rewrite system that can serve as a graphical or textual programming language. As such, benefits include one-step confluence, ease of parallelism and explicit garbage collection. However, some…

This paper focuses on the operation of an electricity market that accounts for participants that bid at a sub-minute timescale. To that end, we model the market-clearing process as a dynamical system, called market dynamics, which is…

Many major works in social science employ matching to make causal conclusions, but different matches on the same data may produce different treatment effect estimates, even when they achieve similar balance or minimize the same loss…

We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…

Discrete-choice models are used in economics, marketing and revenue management to predict customer purchase probabilities, say as a function of prices and other features of the offered assortment. While they have been shown to be…

We study the problem of pure exploration in matching markets under uncertain preferences, where the goal is to identify a stable matching with confidence parameter $\delta$ and minimal sample complexity. Agents learn preferences via…

The way that people make choices or exhibit preferences can be strongly affected by the set of available alternatives, often called the choice set. Furthermore, there are usually heterogeneous preferences, either at an individual level…

We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…

Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees…

We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their preferences over players on the other side of the market.…

The intermittent nature of renewable energy resources creates extra challenges in the operation and control of the electricity grid. Demand flexibility markets can help in dealing with these challenges by introducing incentives for…

Following up on purely theoretical work of Bredereck et al. [AAAI 2020], we contribute further theoretical insights into adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical studies hinting at numerous…

Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…

We study a Markov matching market involving a planner and a set of strategic agents on the two sides of the market. At each step, the agents are presented with a dynamical context, where the contexts determine the utilities. The planner…

Agent-based models provide a constructive approach to studying emergent dynamics in life-like systems composed of interacting, adaptive agents. Financial markets serve as a canonical example of such systems, where collective price dynamics…

We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…

In many empirical studies of a large two-sided matching market (such as in a college admissions problem), the researcher performs statistical inference under the assumption that they observe a random sample from a large matching market. In…

In the Gale-Shapley model of two-sided matching, it is well known that for generic preferences, the outcomes for each side can vary dramatically in the male-optimal vs. female-optimal stable matchings. In this paper, we show that under a…

A matching in a two-sided market often incurs an externality: a matched resource may become unavailable to the other side of the market, at least for a while. This is especially an issue in online platforms involving human experts as the…

Traditional bulk load flexibility options, such as load shifting and load curtailment, for managing uncertainty in power markets limit the diversity of options and ignore the preferences of the individual loads, thus reducing efficiency and…