Related papers: Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets
This study explores the potential of large language models (LLMs) to conduct market experiments, aiming to understand their capability to comprehend competitive market dynamics. We model the behavior of market agents in a controlled…
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…
Matching markets, where agents are assigned to one another based on preferences and capacity constraints, are pervasive in various domains. This paper introduces MATWA (https://matwa.optimalmatching.com), a web application offering a rich…
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash…
Decision markets are mechanisms for selecting one among a set of actions based on forecasts about their consequences. Decision markets that are based on scoring rules have been proven to offer incentive compatibility analogous to properly…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity,…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in…
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…
Matching markets face increasing needs to learn the matching qualities between demand and supply for effective design of matching policies. In practice, the matching rewards are high-dimensional due to the growing diversity of participants.…
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…
We introduce a constrained priority mechanism that combines outcome-based matching from machine-learning with preference-based allocation schemes common in market design. Using real-world data, we illustrate how our mechanism could be…
Motivated by recent applications of sequential decision making in matching markets, in this paper we attempt at formulating and abstracting market designs for P2P lending. We describe a paradigm to set the stage for how peer to peer…
We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that get finalized when a…
Effective learning of user preferences is critical to easing user burden in various types of matching problems. Equally important is active query selection to further reduce the amount of preference information users must provide. We…
We introduce and study a non-equilibrium continuous-time dynamical model of the price of a single asset traded by a population of heterogeneous interacting agents in the presence of uncertainty and regulatory constraints. The model takes…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
The academic job market for new statisticians is highly congested at the interview stage, where departments must rank and select candidates from large applicant pools without credible signals of candidate interest. As a result, interviews…