Related papers: Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets
Kinetic exchange models have been successful in explaining the shape of the income/wealth distribution in the economies. However, such models usually make some ad-hoc assumptions when it comes to determining the savings factor. Here, we…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
We present a model that investigates preference evolution with endogenous matching. In the short run, individuals' subjective preferences influence partner selection and behavior in strategic interactions, which affect their material…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
Reduction rules in interaction nets are constrained to pattern match exactly one argument at a time. Consequently, a programmer has to introduce auxiliary rules to perform more sophisticated matches. In this paper, we describe the design…
Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design…
Prediction markets show considerable promise for developing flexible mechanisms for machine learning. Here, machine learning markets for multivariate systems are defined, and a utility-based framework is established for their analysis. This…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
Nontransitive choices have long been an area of curiosity within economics. However, determining whether nontransitive choices represent an individual's preference is a difficult task since choice data is inherently stochastic. This paper…
We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a…