Matching with Committee Preferences
Abstract
We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the school's internal ranking process. In particular, we define acceptable choices as candidates ranked above a top percentile of the accepted cohort by a sufficient number of evaluators. Stability is then defined in terms of acceptability: accepted candidates must receive strong support, while rejected candidates receive at most weak support. Since exact acceptability and stability may not exist, we construct approximately stable outcomes using a new equilibrium concept that combines matching with a Lindahl equilibrium over ordinal preferences, providing a flexible, equilibrium-based framework for committee-based matching markets.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2602.19009,
title = {Matching with Committee Preferences},
author = {Haoyu Song and Thanh Nguyen and Young-san Lin},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.19009},
year = {2026}
}