Related papers: Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets
Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice…
Statistical matching methods are widely used in the social and health sciences to estimate causal effects using observational data. Often the objective is to find comparable groups with similar covariate distributions in a dataset, with the…
Fitting models to data is an important part of the practice of science. Advances in machine learning have made it possible to fit more -- and more complex -- models, but have also exacerbated a problem: when multiple models fit the data…
We study the problem of decision-making in the setting of a scarcity of shared resources when the preferences of agents are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. Taking the two-sided matching market as a running example, we focus…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…
In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed as compromises between both sides of the market. These…
In many matching markets, one side "applies" to the other, and these applications are often expensive and time-consuming (e.g. students applying to college). It is tempting to think that making the application process easier should benefit…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
This paper proposes a model for combination of external and internal stimuli for the action selection in an autonomous agent, based in an action selection mechanism previously proposed by the authors. This combination model includes…
As automatic optimization techniques find their way into industrial applications, the behavior of many complex systems is determined by some form of planner picking the right actions to optimize a given objective function. In many cases,…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
Sequential fundraising in two sided online platforms enable peer to peer lending by sequentially bringing potential contributors, each of whose decisions impact other contributors in the market. However, understanding the dynamics of…
We characterize the identified sets of a wide range of stochastic choice models, including random utility, various models of boundedly-rational behavior, and dynamic discrete choice. In each of these settings, we show two distributions over…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…
Discrete Choice Modelling serves as a robust framework for modelling human choice behaviour across various disciplines. Building a choice model is a semi structured research process that involves a combination of a priori assumptions,…
Designing a financial market that works well is very important for developing and maintaining an advanced economy, but is not easy because changing detailed rules, even ones that seem trivial, sometimes causes unexpected large impacts and…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
The beneficial effects of treatments vary across individuals in most studies. Treatment heterogeneity motivates practitioners to search for the optimal policy based on personal characteristics. A long-standing common practice in policy…