Related papers: Optimal strategies in concurrent reachability game…

Consider the following probabilistic one-player game: The board is a graph with $n$ vertices, which initially contains no edges. In each step, a new edge is drawn uniformly at random from all non-edges and is presented to the player,…

This paper addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In…

Games on graphs provide a natural and powerful model for reactive systems. In this paper, we consider generalized reachability objectives, defined as conjunctions of reachability objectives. We first prove that deciding the winner in such…

2.5 player parity games combine the challenges posed by 2.5 player reachability games and the qualitative analysis of parity games. These two types of problems are best approached with different types of algorithms: strategy improvement…

We study the parallel Minority Game, where a group of agents, each having two choices, try to independently decide on a strategy such that they stay on minority between their own two choices. However, there are multiple such groups of…

We study the memory resources required for near-optimal play in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with the long-run average payoff. Although optimal strategies may not exist in such games, near-optimal strategies always do. Mertens and…

In this paper we study how to play (stochastic) games optimally using little space. We focus on repeated games with absorbing states, a type of two-player, zero-sum concurrent mean-payoff games. The prototypical example of these games is…

We study a sequential coin-flipping game in which a player starts with~$n$ coins, each landing heads independently with probability~$p$. In each round the player flips all remaining coins and must set aside at least one coin showing heads;…

Given a skew-symmetric matrix, the corresponding two-player symmetric zero-sum game is defined as follows: one player, the row player, chooses a row and the other player, the column player, chooses a column. The payoff of the row player is…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

We prove that optimal strategies exist in every perfect-information stochastic game with finitely many states and actions and a tail winning condition.

We study the optimal use of information in Markov games with incomplete information on one side and two states. We provide a finite-stage algorithm for calculating the limit value as the gap between stages goes to 0, and an optimal strategy…

Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

The term rational has become synonymous with maximizing expected payoff in the definition of the best response in Nash setting. In this work, we consider stochastic games in which players engage only once, or at most a limited number of…

This paper studies two-player zero-sum stochastic Bayesian games where each player has its own dynamic state that is unknown to the other player. Using typical techniques, we provide the recursive formulas and sufficient statistics in both…

We study an elementary two-player card game where in each round players compare cards and the holder of the smallest card wins. Using the rate equations approach, we treat the stochastic version of the game in which cards are drawn…

We study two-player zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with finite state and action space played for an infinite number of steps. In every step, the two players simultaneously and independently choose an action. Given the current state…

We consider an n-player symmetric stochastic game with weak interaction between the players. Time is continuous and the horizon and the number of states are finite. We show that the value function of each of the players can be approximated…

Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…