Related papers: The Obnoxious Facility Location Game with Dichotom…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…
Classical clustering problems such as \emph{Facility Location} and \emph{$k$-Median} aim to efficiently serve a set of clients from a subset of facilities -- minimizing the total cost of facility openings and client assignments in Facility…
We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For…
We consider a model of nomadic agents exploring and competing for time-varying location-specific resources, arising in crowdsourced transportation services, online communities, and in traditional location based economic activity. This model…
Recently, strategic games inspired by Schelling's influential model of residential segregation have been studied in the TCS and AI literature. In these games, agents of k different types occupy the nodes of a network topology aiming to…
In this paper we consider the problem of locating $k$ obnoxious facilities (congruent disks of maximum radius) amidst $n$ demand points (existing repulsive facility sites) ordered from left to right in the plane so that none of the existing…
This paper presents fast, distributed, $O(1)$-approximation algorithms for metric facility location problems with outliers in the Congested Clique model, Massively Parallel Computation (MPC) model, and in the $k$-machine model. The paper…
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of…
We study two stylized, multi-agent models aimed at investing a limited, indivisible resource in public transportation. In the first model, we face the decision of which potential stops to open along a (e.g., bus) path, given agents' travel…
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…
We first show that a better analysis of the algorithm for The Two-Sage Stochastic Facility Location Problem from Srinivasan \cite{sri07} and the algorithm for The Robust Fault Tolerant Facility Location Problem from Byrka et al \cite{bgs10}…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the…
Understanding the evolution of human social systems requires flexible formalisms for the emergence of institutions. Although game theory is normally used to model interactions individually, larger spaces of games can be helpful for modeling…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…
Inspired by the recent COVID-19 pandemic, we study a generalization of the multi-resource allocation problem with heterogeneous demands and Leontief utilities. Unlike existing settings, we allow each agent to specify requirements to only…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…