Related papers: Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness
We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modification of VCG to a less typical environment, namely where we do…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem established that no non-trivial voting rule is strategy-proof, but that does not mean that all voting rules are equally susceptible to strategic manipulation. Over the past fifty years numerous approaches…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
In this communication, a simple mechanism in the optional public goods game is experimentally investigated using two experimental settings; and first time, the cyclic strategy pattern in full state space is demonstrated by means of…
We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents…
We explore the approximation power of deterministic obviously strategy-proof mechanisms in auctions, where the objective is welfare maximization. A trivial ascending auction on the grand bundle guarantees an approximation of $\min\{m,n\}$…
A number of rules for resolving majority cycles in elections have been proposed in the literature. Recently, Holliday and Pacuit (Journal of Theoretical Politics 33 (2021) 475-524) axiomatically characterized the class of rules refined by…
This paper studies the evolution of self-appraisal and social power, for a group of individuals who discuss and form opinions. We consider a modification of the recently proposed DeGroot-Friedkin (DF) model, in which the opinion formation…
Mechanism design on social networks is a hot research direction recently, and we have seen many interesting results in auctions and matching. Compared to the traditional settings, the new goal of the network settings is that we need to…
Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting…
Two main procedures characterize the way in which social actors evaluate the qualities of the options in decision-making processes: they either seek to evaluate their intrinsic qualities (individual learners), or they rely on the opinion of…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
We study the problem of how to construct a set of policies that can be composed together to solve a collection of reinforcement learning tasks. Each task is a different reward function defined as a linear combination of known features. We…
We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties…
Motivated by the success of the serial dictatorship mechanism in social choice settings, we explore its usefulness in tackling various combinatorial optimization problems. We do so by considering an abstract model, in which a set of agents…
Cultural trends and popularity cycles can be observed all around us, yet our theories of social influence and identity expression do not explain what perpetuates these complex, often unpredictable social dynamics. We propose a theory of…
We prove in this paper that, perhaps surprisingly, incentivizing data misreporting is not a fatality. By leveraging a careful design of the loss function, we propose Licchavi, a global and personalized learning framework with provable…
We present some conditions for social preference transitivity under the majority rule when the individual preferences include cycles. First, our concern is with the restriction on the preference orderings of individuals except those (called…
We initiate the study of matching roommates and rooms wherein the preferences of agents over other agents and rooms are complementary and represented by Leontief utilities. In this setting, 2n agents must be paired up and assigned to n…
Social Choice theory generalizes voting on one proposal to ranking multiple proposals. Yet, while a vote on a single proposal has the status quo (Reality) as a default, Reality has been forsaken during this generalization. Here, we propose…