Related papers: Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness
An agent's preferences depend on an ordered parameter or type. We characterize the set of utility functions with single-crossing differences (SCD) in convex environments. These include preferences over lotteries, both in expected utility…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
We study deliberative social choice, where voters engage in small-group discussions to output collective preferences that are then aggregated by a social choice rule. We introduce a simple deliberation-via-matching protocol. In this…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
Stochastic policies (also known as relaxed controls) are widely used in continuous-time reinforcement learning algorithms. However, executing a stochastic policy and evaluating its performance in a continuous-time environment remain open…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
We consider fixed effects binary choice models with a fixed number of periods $T$ and regressors without a large support. If the time-varying unobserved terms are i.i.d. with known distribution $F$, \cite{chamberlain2010} shows that the…
We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results…
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…
Synthetic control (SC) methods have gained rapid popularity in economics recently, where they have been applied in the context of inferring the effects of treatments on standard continuous outcomes assuming linear input-output relations. In…
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace that assumption by the direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is…
The ability to compute reward-optimal policies for given and known finite Markov decision processes (MDPs) underpins a variety of applications across planning, controller synthesis, and verification. However, we often want policies (1) to…
This paper is part of an emerging line of work at the intersection of machine learning and mechanism design, which aims to avoid noise in training data by correctly aligning the incentives of data sources. Specifically, we focus on the…
Social scientists often study how a policy reform impacted a single targeted country. Increasingly, this is done with the synthetic control method (SCM). SCM models the country's counterfactual (non-reform or untreated) trajectory as a…
When does society eventually learn the truth, or take the correct action, via observational learning? In a general model of sequential learning over social networks, we identify a simple condition for learning dubbed excludability.…
We present a simple proof of a well-known axiomatic characterization of state-salient decision rules, using Weak Dominance Criterion and Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Subsequently we provide a simple axiomatic…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
There is an extensive literature in social choice theory studying the consequences of weakening the assumptions of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Much of this literature suggests that there is no escape from Arrow-style impossibility…
Continuous-time Markov decision processes are an important class of models in a wide range of applications, ranging from cyber-physical systems to synthetic biology. A central problem is how to devise a policy to control the system in order…