Related papers: Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assignment. Exploiting the special structure of the assignment…
The key contribution of the paper is a comprehensive study of the egalitarian mechanism with respect to manipulation by a coalition of agents. Our main result is that the egalitarian mechanism is, in fact, peak group strategyproof : no…
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a seminal result of Social Choice Theory that demonstrates the impossibility of ranked-choice decision-making processes to jointly satisfy a number of intuitive and seemingly desirable constraints. The…
This paper studies the housing market problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We probe the Machiavellian frontier of the well-known top trading cycles (TTC) rule by weakening strategy-proofness and providing new characterizations…
Many high-stakes decisions in health care, public policy, and clinical development require committing to a single policy that will be applied uniformly across a heterogeneous population. Regulatory and fairness standards sometime requires…
In a strategy-proof mechanism, the influence of an agent may be measured as the set of outcomes an agent can bring about by varying her (reported) type. More specifically, we refer to an agent's influence on her own relevant outcomes as her…
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…
Social networks often provide only a binary perspective on social ties: two individuals are either connected or not. While sometimes external information can be used to infer the strength of social ties, access to such information may be…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
Top trading cycles with fixed tie-breaking (TTC) has been suggested to deal with indifferences in object allocation problems. Unfortunately, under general indifferences, TTC is neither Pareto efficient nor group strategy-proof. Furthermore,…
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto…
Prediction markets are widely treated as forecasting devices that reveal collective expectations about uncertain futures. This article argues that under specifiable conditions they also function as coordination mechanisms: public…
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…
Two distinct specifications of single peakedness as currently met in the relevant literature are singled out and discussed. Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications, a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive…
We investigate the possibility of an incentive-compatible (IC, a.k.a. strategy-proof) mechanism for the classification of agents in a network according to their reviews of each other. In the $ \alpha $-classification problem we are…
We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…
Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that typically arise from applying decision rules…
We provide novel simple representations of strategy-proof voting rules when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences (as well as multi-dimensional separable preferences). The analysis recovers, links and unifies existing…
Stochastic control barrier functions (SCBFs) provide a safety-critical control framework for systems subject to stochastic disturbances by bounding the probability of remaining within a safe set. However, synthesizing a valid SCBF that…
In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is…