Related papers: Facility Location Games with Ordinal Preferences
We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…
We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to…
Game theory serves as a powerful tool for distributed optimization in multi-agent systems in different applications. In this paper we consider multi-agent systems that can be modeled by means of potential games whose potential function…
Diffusion mechanism design, which investigate how to incentivise agents to invite as many colleagues to a multi-agent decision making as possible, is a new research paradigm at the intersection between microeconomics and computer science.…
We study Nash equilibria in strategic facility location games where clients are located in an arbitrary metric space. Specifically, there are $n$ clients, and the goal is to choose a facility from a set of given locations, so that the total…
We consider linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) network games in which agents have quadratic payoffs that depend on their individual and neighbors' actions, and an unknown payoff-relevant state. An information designer determines the fidelity…
We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in…
Shapleys impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more…
We initiate the study of matching roommates and rooms wherein the preferences of agents over other agents and rooms are complementary and represented by Leontief utilities. In this setting, 2n agents must be paired up and assigned to n…
In adversarial settings, a mobile agent may strategically plan its motion to influence an opponent's inference about its intended goal. We study deceptive path planning in a scenario where a mobile agent aims to reach a privately selected…
We consider the problem of locating a single facility for 2 agents in $L_p$ space ($1<p<\infty$) and give a nearly complete characterization of such deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We use the distance between an agent and the…
In this paper, we study the Facility Location Problem with Scarce Resources (FLPSR) under the assumption that agents' type follow a probability distribution. In the FLPSR, the objective is to identify the optimal locations for one or more…
In the recently introduced topological distance games, strategic agents need to be assigned to a subset of vertices of a topology. In the assignment, the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents…
We study the facility location mechanism design problem where $n$ agents report their locations in Euclidean space, and the output is a single facility location. The cost function of each agent is the distance from the returned facility,…
We investigate an algorithm that assigns to any game in normal form an approximating game that admits an ordinal potential function. Due to the properties of potential games, the algorithm equips every game with a surrogate reward structure…
We often try to predict others' actions by obtaining supporting information that shows a preference index of surrounding people. In order to reproduce these situations, we propose a game named "One-sided Preference Game with Reference…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…
We study the online facility assignment problem on regular polygons, where all sides are of equal length. The influence of specific geometric settings has remained mostly unexplored, even though classical online facility assignment problems…
Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategy-proof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for…
Goods and services -- public housing, medical appointments, schools -- are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual…