Related papers: On the relation between Preference Reversal and St…
Data regulations increasingly enable consumers to switch among market segments, making segmentation an endogenous outcome of strategic interaction. We study a model in which consumers choose segments before a monopolist sets…
This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agenda manipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, so powerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding of Arrow's…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
We provide novel simple representations of strategy-proof voting rules when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences (as well as multi-dimensional separable preferences). The analysis recovers, links and unifies existing…
Recovering and distinguishing between the strict-preference, indifference and/or indecisiveness parts of a decision maker's preferences is a challenging task but also important for testing theory and conducting welfare analysis. This paper…
We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or…
We state the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in terms of preference elicitation, resulting in a principled (Bayesian) statistical formulation. This generalises previous work on Bayesian inverse reinforcement learning and allows us…
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional…
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict…
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked…
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to…
Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, as has been described in the literature, when agents take…
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that…
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…
We prove that every Condorcet-consistent voting rule can be manipulated by a voter who completely reverses their preference ranking, assuming that there are at least 4 alternatives. This corrects an error and improves a result of [Sanver,…
There has been considerable work on reasoning about the strategic ability of agents under imperfect information. However, existing logics such as Probabilistic Strategy Logic are unable to express properties relating to information…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects to agents when agents have strict preferences over objects. There are inherent trade-offs between competing notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives in assignment mechanisms.…
We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations,…