Related papers: On the relation between Preference Reversal and St…
Human interactions are influenced by emotions, temperament, and affection, often conflicting with individuals' underlying preferences. Without explicit knowledge of those preferences, judging whether behaviour is appropriate becomes…
We study a majority based preference diffusion model in which the members of a social network update their preferences based on those of their connections. Consider an undirected graph where each node has a strict linear order over a set of…
In random expected utility (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006), the distribution of preferences is uniquely recoverable from random choice. This paper shows through two examples that such uniqueness fails in general if risk preferences are random…
This paper initiates the study of the testable implications of choice data in settings where agents have privacy preferences. We adapt the standard conceptualization of consumer choice theory to a situation where the consumer is aware of,…
Sequential allocation is a simple allocation mechanism in which agents are given pre-specified turns and each agents gets the most preferred item that is still available. It has long been known that sequential allocation is not…
The impossibility theorem in Roth (1982) states that no stable mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness. This paper explores the Machiavellian frontier of stable mechanisms by weakening strategy-proofness. For a fixed mechanism $\varphi$ and…
In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…
The correlations and network structure amongst individuals in datasets today---whether explicitly articulated, or deduced from biological or behavioral connections---pose new issues around privacy guarantees, because of inferences that can…
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose…
Statistical protocols are often used for decision-making involving multiple parties, each with their own incentives, private information, and ability to influence the distributional properties of the data. We study a game-theoretic version…
This study proposes a new efficiency requirement, a minimal almost weak Pareto principle, which says that x is socially better than y whenever the only one individual never prefers y to x, and all the others prefers x to y. Then, I show…
It is a commonly held belief that enforcing invariance improves generalisation. Although this approach enjoys widespread popularity, it is only very recently that a rigorous theoretical demonstration of this benefit has been established. In…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. We propose a novel family of neutral and strategy-proof rules, which we call sequential unanimity rules. By demonstrating their formal equivalence to the M-winning…
Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…
While the importance of personalized policymaking is widely recognized, fully personalized implementation remains rare in practice, often due to legal, fairness or cost concerns. We study the problem of policy targeting for a regret-averse…
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
The paper analyzes the problem of judgments or preferences subsequent to initial analysis by autonomous agents in a hierarchical system where the higher level agents does not have access to group size information. We propose methods that…