Related papers: XDO: A Double Oracle Algorithm for Extensive-Form …
This paper examines the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for two-player games with sufficiently many actions, the dynamics converge quickly…
We examine global non-asymptotic convergence properties of policy gradient methods for multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) problems in Markov potential games (MPG). To learn a Nash equilibrium of an MPG in which the size of state space…
We analyze best response dynamics for finding a Nash equilibrium of an infinite horizon zero-sum stochastic linear quadratic dynamic game (LQDG) with partial and asymmetric information. We derive explicit expressions for each player's best…
We introduce Mean-Field Trust Region Policy Optimization (MF-TRPO), a novel algorithm designed to compute approximate Nash equilibria for ergodic Mean-Field Games (MFG) in finite state-action spaces. Building on the well-established…
This paper concerns computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games, which has been shown to be PLS-complete. With the help of $\hat{\Psi}$-game and approximate potential functions, we propose two algorithms based on…
Since the seminal PPAD-completeness result for computing a Nash equilibrium even in two-player games, an important line of research has focused on relaxations achievable in polynomial time. In this paper, we consider the notion of…
The field development optimization (FDO) problem represents a challenging mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem in which we seek to obtain the number of wells, their type, location, and drilling sequence that maximizes an…
Game theoretic methods have become popular for planning and prediction in situations involving rich multi-agent interactions. However, these methods often assume the existence of a single local Nash equilibria and are hence unable to handle…
We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…
This paper investigates the problem of computing the equilibrium of competitive games, which is often modeled as a constrained saddle-point optimization problem with probability simplex constraints. Despite recent efforts in understanding…
This paper presents algorithms for non-zero sum nonlinear constrained dynamic games with full information. Such problems emerge when multiple players with action constraints and differing objectives interact with the same dynamic system.…
Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…
We study model-based and model-free policy optimization in a class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games called linear quadratic (LQ) deep structured games. In such games, players interact with each other through a set of weighted…
We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by both normal-form games and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the learning agent is restricted to using a best-response oracle.…
We study the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria $\mathcal X_\star \times \mathcal Y_\star$ in two-player zero-sum matrix games. Fearnley and Savani (2016) showed that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an $n…
We introduce MetaDOAR, a lightweight meta-controller that augments the Double Oracle / PSRO paradigm with a learned, partition-aware filtering layer and Q-value caching to enable scalable multi-agent reinforcement learning on very large…
We provide a series of algorithms demonstrating that solutions according to the fundamental game-theoretic solution concept of closed under rational behavior (CURB) sets in two-player, normal-form games can be computed in polynomial time…
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) -- where multiple agents learn to interact in a shared dynamic environment -- permeates across a wide range of critical applications. While there has been substantial progress on understanding the…