MPOGames: Efficient Multimodal Partially Observable Dynamic Games
Abstract
Game theoretic methods have become popular for planning and prediction in situations involving rich multi-agent interactions. However, these methods often assume the existence of a single local Nash equilibria and are hence unable to handle uncertainty in the intentions of different agents. While maximum entropy (MaxEnt) dynamic games try to address this issue, practical approaches solve for MaxEnt Nash equilibria using linear-quadratic approximations which are restricted to unimodal responses and unsuitable for scenarios with multiple local Nash equilibria. By reformulating the problem as a POMDP, we propose MPOGames, a method for efficiently solving MaxEnt dynamic games that captures the interactions between local Nash equilibria. We show the importance of uncertainty-aware game theoretic methods via a two-agent merge case study. Finally, we prove the real-time capabilities of our approach with hardware experiments on a 1/10th scale car platform.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2210.10814,
title = {MPOGames: Efficient Multimodal Partially Observable Dynamic Games},
author = {Oswin So and Paul Drews and Thomas Balch and Velin Dimitrov and Guy Rosman and Evangelos A. Theodorou},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.10814},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
Accepted to ICRA 2023