Related papers: Equilibrium Refinements for Multi-Agent Influence …
Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are probabilistic graphical models which represent strategic interactions between agents. MAIDs are equivalent to extensive form games (EFGs) but have a more compact and informative structure. However,…
Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are a popular game-theoretic model based on Bayesian networks. In some settings, MAIDs offer significant advantages over extensive-form game representations. Previous work on MAIDs has assumed that…
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) governance models have become increasingly complex due to the involvement of numerous independent agents, each with their own incentives and strategies. To effectively analyze these systems, we propose using…
We present an algorithm that identifies the reasoning patterns of agents in a game, by iteratively examining the graph structure of its Multi-Agent Influence Diagram (MAID) representation. If the decision of an agent participates in no…
In this paper we introduce temporal action graph games (TAGGs), a novel graphical representation of imperfect-information extensive form games. We show that when a game involves anonymity or context-specific utility independencies, its…
Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact…
Mean Field Games (MFG) are the class of games with a very large number of agents and the standard equilibrium concept is a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE). Algorithms for learning MFE in dynamic MFGs are unknown in general. Our focus is on an…
This paper presents Networks of Influence Diagrams (NID), a compact, natural and highly expressive language for reasoning about agents beliefs and decision-making processes. NIDs are graphical structures in which agents mental models are…
We propose a game-theoretic framework for adaptive multi-agent intelligent systems. Unlike classical game theory, which often treats strategies as primitive objects chosen by perfectly rational agents, the proposed framework provides a…
We study discrete-time, finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) under model uncertainty, where agents face ambiguity about the state transition probabilities. Each agent maximizes its expected payoff against the worst-case transitions within…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
Steering cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) towards desired outcomes is challenging, particularly when the global guidance from a human on the whole multi-agent system is impractical in a large-scale MARL. On the other…
We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of "possible profiles" that are within a certain distance from the actual action profile.…
We focus on the problem of sequential decision making in partially observable environments shared with other agents of uncertain types having similar or conflicting objectives. This problem has been previously formalized by multiple…
Automated game balancing has often focused on single-agent scenarios. In this paper we present a tool for balancing multi-player games during game design. Our approach requires a designer to construct an intuitive graphical representation…
We investigate an infinite-horizon time-inconsistent mean-field game (MFG) in a discrete time setting. We first present a classic equilibrium for the MFG and its associated existence result. This classic equilibrium aligns with the…
We consider a class of mean field games in which the agents interact through both their states and controls, and we focus on situations in which a generic agent tries to adjust her speed (control) to an average speed (the average is made in…
We introduce Game networks (G nets), a novel representation for multi-agent decision problems. Compared to other game-theoretic representations, such as strategic or extensive forms, G nets are more structured and more compact; more…
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…
Training multi-agent systems (MAS) to achieve realistic equilibria gives us a useful tool to understand and model real-world systems. We consider a general sum partially observable Markov game where agents of different types share a single…