Reinforcement Learning for Mean Field Games with Strategic Complementarities
Abstract
Mean Field Games (MFG) are the class of games with a very large number of agents and the standard equilibrium concept is a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE). Algorithms for learning MFE in dynamic MFGs are unknown in general. Our focus is on an important subclass that possess a monotonicity property called Strategic Complementarities (MFG-SC). We introduce a natural refinement to the equilibrium concept that we call Trembling-Hand-Perfect MFE (T-MFE), which allows agents to employ a measure of randomization while accounting for the impact of such randomization on their payoffs. We propose a simple algorithm for computing T-MFE under a known model. We also introduce a model-free and a model-based approach to learning T-MFE and provide sample complexities of both algorithms. We also develop a fully online learning scheme that obviates the need for a simulator. Finally, we empirically evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms via examples motivated by real-world applications.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2006.11683,
title = {Reinforcement Learning for Mean Field Games with Strategic Complementarities},
author = {Kiyeob Lee and Desik Rengarajan and Dileep Kalathil and Srinivas Shakkottai},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.11683},
year = {2021}
}