Related papers: Equilibrium Refinements for Multi-Agent Influence …
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…
Similar to the role of Markov decision processes in reinforcement learning, Stochastic Games (SGs) lay the foundation for the study of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and sequential agent interactions. In this paper, we derive…
Strategic games admit a multi-graph representation, in which two kinds of relations, accessibility, and preferences, are used to describe how the players compare the possible outcomes. A category of games with a fixed set of players…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
In this paper, we present a model of a game among teams. Each team consists of a homogeneous population of agents. Agents within a team are cooperative while the teams compete with other teams. The dynamics and the costs are coupled through…
We tackle a fundamental problem in empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), that of learning equilibria of simulation-based games. Such games cannot be described in analytical form; instead, a black-box simulator can be queried to obtain…
In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…
In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may intervene by either redesigning the system or incentivizing…
The Influence Maximization (IM) problem is a well-known NP-hard combinatorial problem over graphs whose goal is to find the set of nodes in a network that spreads influence at most. Among the various methods for solving the IM problem,…
Mobile autonomous system (MAS) becomes pervasive especially in the vehicular and robotic networks. Multiple heterogeneous MAS networks can be integrated together as a multi-layer MAS network to offer holistic services. The network…
We present a new approach to the solution of decision problems formulated as influence diagrams. The approach converts the influence diagram into a simpler structure, the LImited Memory Influence Diagram (LIMID), where only the requisite…
We present novel techniques for neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games, a recently proposed modelling formalism to represent a set of probabilistic agents operating in a continuous-space environment using a combination of neural network…
Achieving human-AI alignment in complex multi-agent games is crucial for creating trustworthy AI agents that enhance gameplay. We propose a method to evaluate this alignment using an interpretable task-sets framework, focusing on high-level…
Conventional Mean-field games/control study the behavior of a large number of rational agents moving in the Euclidean spaces. In this work, we explore the mean-field games on Riemannian manifolds. We formulate the mean-field game Nash…
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form games, computing a proper equilibrium is known to be…
Learning by experience in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) is a difficult and exciting task, due to the lack of stationarity of the environment, whose dynamics evolves as the population learns. In order to design scalable algorithms for systems…
While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…
We present a new tool for the study of multiplayer stochastic games, namely the modified game, which is a normal-form game that depends on the discount factor, the initial state, and for every player a partition of the set of states and a…