Related papers: Network Design for Social Welfare
We propose fully-distributed algorithms for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. We first consider the case where local constraints are present and we design an algorithm combining, for each agent, (i) the projected…
This paper considers a networked aggregative game (NAG) where the players are distributed over a communication network. By only communicating with a subset of players, the goal of each player in the NAG is to minimize an individual cost…
We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins…
We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…
In this letter, we study distributed optimization and Nash equilibrium-seeking dynamics from a contraction theoretic perspective. Our first result is a novel bound on the logarithmic norm of saddle matrices. Second, for distributed gradient…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
We consider static finite-player network games and their continuum analogs, graphon games. Existence and uniqueness results are provided, as well as convergence of the finite-player network game optimal strategy profiles to their analogs…
We describe a social game that we designed for encouraging energy efficient behavior amongst building occupants with the aim of reducing overall energy consumption in the building. Occupants vote for their desired lighting level and win…
We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…
In this paper, we aim to design a distributed approximate algorithm for seeking Nash equilibria of an aggregative game. Due to the local set constraints of each player, projectionbased algorithms have been widely employed for solving such…
Internet and graphs are very much related. The graphical structure of internet has been studied extensively to provide efficient solutions to routing and other problems. But most of these studies assume a central authority which controls…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
Security games model strategic interactions in adversarial real-world applications. Such applications often involve extremely large but highly structured strategy sets (e.g., selecting a distribution over all patrol routes in a given…
In the Binary Networked Public Goods game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community. We study the problem of deciding if there exists a pure strategy Nash…
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the response actions of a set of players embedded in sub-networks in the context of interaction and learning. We characterize strategic network formation as a static game of…
Our paper addresses characterizing conditions for a linear quadratic (LQ) game to be a potential game. The desired properties of potential games in finite action settings, such as convergence of learning dynamics to Nash equilibria, and the…
This paper studies the performance of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) when the nodes, that form a Poisson point process, selfishly choose their Medium Access Probability (MAP). We consider goodput and delay as the performance metric that…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
A key feature of wireless communications is the spatial reuse. However, the spatial aspect is not yet well understood for the purpose of designing efficient spectrum sharing mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a framework of spatial…