Related papers: Game-Theoretic Upper Expectations for Discrete-Tim…
Probabilistic timed automata are a suitable formalism to model systems with real-time, nondeterministic and probabilistic behaviour. We study two-player zero-sum games on such automata where the objective of the game is specified as the…
We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…
This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…
This paper investigates some necessary and sufficient conditions for a game to be a potential game. At first, we extend the classical results of Slade and Monderer and Shapley from games with one-dimensional action spaces to games with…
Professional team sports provide an excellent domain for studying the dynamics of social competitions. These games are constructed with simple, well-defined rules and payoffs that admit a high-dimensional set of possible actions and…
We study the CHSH inequality from an informational, timing-sensitive viewpoint using game-theoretic probability, which avoids assuming an underlying probability space. The locality loophole and the measurement-dependence…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
In previous work on higher-order games, we accounted for finite games of unbounded length by working with continuous outcome functions, which carry implicit game trees. In this work we make such trees explicit. We use concepts from…
We study potential games on unimodular random graphs of bounded degree, where players interact through the underlying network. Using the unimodular measure, we define a well-posed global potential that captures both finite- and…
In a zero-sum stochastic game with signals, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by these decisions and a variable called state. The state follows a Markov chain, that is controlled by…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…
A game-theoretic framework for time-inconsistent stopping problems where the time-inconsistency is due to the consideration of a non-linear function of an expected reward is developed. A class of mixed strategy stopping times that allows…
We consider two-player stochastic games played on a finite graph for infinitely many rounds. Stochastic games generalize both Markov decision processes (MDP) by adding an adversary player, and two-player deterministic games by adding…
We investigate first-order notions of correlated equilibria in smooth games, in which players do not incur any regret against small modifications of their actions prescribed by some vector field. We define two such notions, based on local…
Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a situation where players…
This article continues study of the prequential framework for evaluating a probability forecaster. Testing the hypothesis that the sequence of forecasts issued by the forecaster is in agreement with the observed outcomes can be done using…
We consider finite horizon reach-avoid problems for discrete time stochastic systems. Our goal is to construct upper bound functions for the reach-avoid probability by means of tractable convex optimization problems. We achieve this by…
Stochastic games are a natural model for the synthesis of controllers confronted to adversarial and/or random actions. In particular, $\omega$-regular games of infinite length can represent reactive systems which are not expected to reach a…
We develop a new framework of uncertainty variables to model uncertainty. An uncertainty variable is characterized by an uncertainty set, in which its realization is bound to lie, while the conditional uncertainty is characterized by a set…
Last-iterate behaviors of learning algorithms in repeated two-player zero-sum games have been extensively studied due to their wide applications in machine learning and related tasks. Typical algorithms that exhibit the last-iterate…