Related papers: Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling
We study data-driven stabilization of continuous-time systems in autoregressive form when only noisy input-output data are available. First, we provide an operator-based characterization of the set of systems consistent with the data. Next,…
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
This paper studies a durable goods monopoly with multiple provision levels, free disposability, and zero marginal cost. We establish a Folk-Theorem-type result: as parties become sufficiently patient, equilibrium seller payoffs contains an…
Classical sufficient conditions for ensuring the robust stability of a dynamical system in feedback with a nonlinearity include passivity, small gain, circle, and conicity theorems. We present a generalized version of these results for…
We consider the pricing of derivatives in a setting with trading restrictions, but without any probabilistic assumptions on the underlying model, in discrete and continuous time. In particular, we assume that European put or call options…
The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas…
We study a continuous time economy where agents have asymmetric information. The informed agent (``$I$''), at time zero, receives a private signal about the risky assets' terminal payoff $\Psi(X_T)$, while the uninformed agent (``$U$'') has…
Recent interests in dynamic decision modeling have led to the development of several representation and inference methods. These methods however, have limited application under time critical conditions where a trade-off between model…
In this paper, it is shown that a simple formulation of Economic Model Predictive Control can be used which possesses two features that are generally viewed as mutually exclusive, namely, a rather short prediction horizon…
Market efficiency at least requires the absence of weak arbitrage opportunities, but this is not sufficient to establish a situation where the market is sensitive, i.e., where it "fully reflects" or "rapidly adjusts to" some information…
In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…
We study expert advice under reputational incentives, with sell-side equity research as the lead application. A long-lived analyst receives a continuous private signal about a binary payoff and recommends a risky (Buy) or safe action.…
We study a sequential social learning model in which there is uncertainty about the informativeness of a common signal-generating process. Rational agents arrive in order and make decisions based on the past actions of others and their…
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…
We propose and analyze numerically a simple dynamical model that describes the firm behaviors under uncertainty of demand forecast. Iterating this simple model and varying some parameters values we observe a wide variety of market dynamics…
Real-world systems are characterized by complex interactions of their internal degrees of freedom, while living in ever-changing environments whose net effect is to act as additional couplings. Here, we introduce a paradigmatic interacting…
In this work we consider selling items using a sequential first price auction mechanism. We generalize the assumption of conservative bidding to extensive form games (henceforth optimistic conservative bidding), and show that for both…
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally…
Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impatience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for…