Related papers: Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling
Learning disentangled representations that correspond to factors of variation in real-world data is critical to interpretable and human-controllable machine learning. Recently, concerns about the viability of learning disentangled…
This paper focuses on the operation of an electricity market that accounts for participants that bid at a sub-minute timescale. To that end, we model the market-clearing process as a dynamical system, called market dynamics, which is…
This paper proposes a theory of stock market predictability patterns based on a model of heterogeneous beliefs. In a discrete finite time framework, some agents receive news about an asset's fundamental value through a noisy signal. The…
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
In this paper, we consider the data-driven discovery of stable dynamical models with a single equilibrium. The proposed approach uses a basis-function parameterization of the differential equations and the associated Lyapunov function. This…
We show that strategies implemented in automatic theorem proving involve an interesting tradeoff between execution speed, proving speedup/computational time and usefulness of information. We advance formal definitions for these concepts by…
This paper considers dynamic moral hazard settings, in which the consequences of the agent's actions are not precisely understood. In a new continuous-time moral hazard model with drift ambiguity, the agent's unobservable action translates…
We study how a principal can jointly shape an agent's timing and action through information. We develop a revelation principle: with intertemporal commitment, the problem simplifies to choosing a joint distribution over stopping times and…
We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium outcomes are characterized by Cheapest Signal Equilibria,…
Learning under one-sided feedback (i.e., where we only observe the labels for examples we predicted positively on) is a fundamental problem in machine learning -- applications include lending and recommendation systems. Despite this, there…
In the same way that subsequent pauses in spoken language are used to convey information, it is also possible to transmit information in communication networks not only by message content, but also with its timing. This paper presents an…
When deploying autonomous agents in the real world, we need effective ways of communicating objectives to them. Traditional skill learning has revolved around reinforcement and imitation learning, each with rigid constraints on the format…
Stochastic feedback systems give rise to a variety of notions of stability. The conditions for the stability of the median, mean, and variance stability conditions differ. These conditions can be stated explicitly for scalar discrete-time…
We present some novel results indicating that time's description in present-day physics is deficient. We use Hawking's information-erasure hypothesis to counter his own claim that time's arrow depends only on initial conditions. Next, we…
Opinion dynamics concerns social processes through which populations or groups of individuals agree or disagree on specific issues. As such, modelling opinion dynamics represents an important research area that has been progressively…
In this paper we study the problem of information sharing among rational self-interested agents as a dynamic game of asymmetric information. We assume that the agents imperfectly observe a Markov chain and they are called to decide whether…
We present results on simulations of a stock market with heterogeneous, cumulative information setup. We find a non-monotonic behaviour of traders' returns as a function of their information level. Particularly, the average informed agents…
When multiple informative equilibria are possible in a general cheap talk game, how much information can a principal guarantee herself? To answer this question, I define the notion of worst-case implementation-implementation via the worst…
Learning systems are typically optimized by minimizing loss or maximizing reward, assuming that improvements in these signals reflect progress toward the true objective. However, when feedback reliability is unobservable, this assumption…
We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: she stays silent if players choose her preferred action, but…