Related papers: Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling
We study a signaling game between an employer and a potential employee, where the employee has private information regarding their production capacity. At the initial stage, the employee communicates a salary claim, after which the true…
We study information aggregation in a dynamic trading model with partially informed traders. Ostrovsky [2012] showed that `separable' securities aggregate information in all equilibria, however, determining whether a security is separable…
When estimating a single subsystem (module) in a linear dynamic network with a prediction error method, a data-informativity condition needs to be satisfied for arriving at a consistent module estimate. This concerns a condition on input…
This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive according to a Poisson process. A hidden state determines…
Language is not only used to transmit neutral information; we often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be…
This tutorial article puts forth a framework to analyze the noncooperative strategic interactions among the members of a large population of bounded rationality agents. Our approach hinges on, unifies and generalizes existing methods and…
We propose predictive information, that is information between a long past of duration T and the entire infinitely long future of a time series, as a universal order parameter to study phase transitions in physical systems. It can be used,…
We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium…
Despite many examples to the contrary, most models of elections assume that rules determining the winner will be followed. We present a model where elections are solely a public signal of the incumbent popularity, and citizens can protests…
We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…
Early warning indicators often suffer from the shortness and coarse-graining of real-world time series. Furthermore, the typically strong and correlated noise contributions in real applications are severe drawbacks for statistical measures.…
We analyze a simple macroeconomic model where rational inflation expectations is replaced by a boundedly rational, and genuinely sticky, response to changes in the actual inflation rate. The stickiness is introduced in a novel way using a…
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…
Human sociality depends upon the benefits of mutual aid and extensive communication. However mutual aid is made difficult by the problems of coordinating diverse norms and preferences, and communication is harried by substantial ambiguity…
We develop a hierarchical Bayesian dynamic game for competitive inventory and pricing under incomplete information. Two firms repeatedly choose order quantities and prices while facing two layers of uncertainty: unknown market demand and…
We study dynamic delegation with reputation feedback: a long-lived expert advises a sequence of implementers whose effort responds to current reputation, altering outcome informativeness and belief updates. We solve for a recursive,…
We examine the dynamics of informational efficiency in a market with asymmetrically informed, boundedly rational traders who adaptively learn optimal strategies using simple multiarmed bandit (MAB) algorithms. The strategies available to…
A first attempt at obtaining market--directional information from a non--stationary solution of the dynamic equation "future price tends to the value that maximizes the number of shares traded per unit time" [1] is presented. We demonstrate…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…