Related papers: Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling

This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair of randomised stopping times to form a saddle point of a zero-sum Dynkin game with partial and/or asymmetric information across players. The framework is non-Markovian and…

Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where…

A seller wants to sell a good to a set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller has private information about her cost, it is impossible for a static mechanism to achieve the optimal revenue. In particular, even…

Finding interdependency relations between (possibly multivariate) time series provides valuable knowledge about the processes that generate the signals. Information theory sets a natural framework for non-parametric measures of several…

This paper develops a theory of learning under ambiguity induced by the decision maker's beliefs about the collection of data correlated with the true state of the world. Within our framework, two classical results on Bayesian learning…

The energy transition is expected to significantly increase the share of renewable energy sources whose production is intermittent in the electricity mix. Apart from key benefits, this development has the major drawback of generating a…

I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…

In this paper we analyse a dynamic model of investment under uncertainty in a duopoly, in which each firm has an option to switch from the present market to a new market. We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies and…

Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incentive compatible. We find that if each side has a…

A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct…

The information dynamics in finance and insurance applications is usually modeled by a filtration. This paper looks at situations where information restrictions apply such that the information dynamics may become non-monotone. A fundamental…

This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…

A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…

An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent…

Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…

Traditionally, an agent's beliefs would come from what the agent can see, hear, or sense. In the modern world, beliefs are often based on the data available to the agents. In this work, we investigate a dynamic logic of such beliefs that…

We present a new data-driven model of fairness that, unlike existing static definitions of individual or group fairness is guided by the unfairness complaints received by the system. Our model supports multiple fairness criteria and takes…

Departing from the dominant approach focused on individual and meso-level determinants, this paper develops a macroeconomic formalization of job insecurity within a New Keynesian framework in which the standard IS-NKPC-Taylor rule block is…

We present a model describing the competition between information transmission and decision making in financial markets. The solution of this simple model is recalled, and possible variations discussed. It is shown numerically that despite…

This paper introduces a class of non-linear and continuous-time opinion dynamics model with additive noise and state dependent interaction rates between agents. The model features interaction rates which are proportional to a negative power…