Related papers: Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling
Tasks that require information about the world imply a trade-off between the time spent on observation and the variance of the response. In particular, fast decisions need to rely on uncertain information. However, standard estimates of…
We address the information/disturbance trade-off for state-measurements on continuous variable Gaussian systems and suggest minimal schemes for implementations. In our schemes, the symbols from a given alphabet are encoded in a set of…
We frame dynamic persuasion in a partial observation stochastic control Leader-Follower game with an ergodic criterion. The Receiver controls the dynamics of a multidimensional unobserved state process. Information is provided to the…
Recent studies on transportation networks have shown that real-time route guidance can inadvertently induce congestion or oscillatory traffic patterns. Nevertheless, such technologies also offer a promising opportunity to manage traffic…
Individual components such as cells, particles, or agents within a larger system often require detailed understanding of their relative position to act accordingly, enabling the system as a whole to function in an organised and efficient…
I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…
We develop a novel framework for costly information acquisition in which a decision-maker learns about an unobserved state by choosing a signal distribution, with the cost of information determined by the distribution of noise in the…
We revisit a model for time-varying linear regression that assumes the unknown parameters evolve according to a linear dynamical system. Counterintuitively, we show that when the underlying dynamics are stable the parameters of this model…
A sender communicates private information about a hidden state to a receiver who seeks to match his action to that state. The sender strives to appear informed at the receiver's expense. I characterize informative equilibria under a broad…
We study in detail and explicitly solve the version of Kyle's model introduced in a specific case in \cite{BB}, where the trading horizon is given by an exponentially distributed random time. The first part of the paper is devoted to the…
This paper analyzes repeated version of the bilateral trade model where the independent payoff relevant private information of the buyer and the seller is correlated across time. Using this setup it makes the following five contributions.…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…
We present a general framework for evolutionary learning to emergent unbiased state representation without any supervision. Evolutionary frameworks such as self-play converge to bad local optima in case of multi-agent reinforcement learning…
Classical Kyle-type models of informed trading typically treat noise trader demand as purely exogenous. In reality, many market participants react to price movements and news, generating feedback effects that can significantly alter market…
In speculative markets, risk-free profit opportunities are eliminated by traders exploiting them. Markets are therefore often described as "informationally efficient", rapidly removing predictable price changes, and leaving only residual…
The representations of conditional entropy and conditional mutual information are significant in explaining the unique effects among variables. While previous studies based on conditional contrastive sampling have effectively removed…
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…
Economics has long been a science of static equilibria, in which time is a second-order rather than first-order concern. Without time, economic modelers may neglect or obscure the role of time-dependent phenomena, e.g. path-dependency, and…
We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…