Related papers: Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling
In the persuasion model, apart from a few special cases, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first…
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the…
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
In a unified framework we study equilibrium in the presence of an insider having information on the signal of the firm value, which is naturally connected to the fundamental price of the firm related asset. The fundamental value itself is…
This paper proposes a model to explain the potential role of inter-group conflicts in determining the rise and fall of signaling norms. Individuals in a population are characterized by high and low productivity types and they are matched in…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show…
This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…
This brief note considers the problem of estimating temporal synergy and integrated information in dyadic dynamical processes. One of the standard estimators of dynamic synergy is based on the minimal mutual information between sets of…
This paper characterizes equilibrium properties of a broad class of economic models that allow multiple heterogeneous agents to interact in heterogeneous manners across several markets. Our key contribution is a new theorem providing…
We study a discrete-time financial market with a single constrained trader, competitive market makers, and noise traders. Within the class of linear equilibria, the equilibrium structure is shown to be uniquely determined by two state…
The problem of peer prediction is to elicit information from agents in settings without any objective ground truth against which to score reports. Peer prediction mechanisms seek to exploit correlations between signals to align incentives…
I relax the standard assumptions of transitivity and partition structure in economic models of information to formalize vague knowledge: non-transitive indistinguishability over states. I show that vague knowledge, while failing to…
We develop a rigorous walk-forward validation framework for algorithmic trading designed to mitigate overfitting and lookahead bias. Our methodology combines interpretable hypothesis-driven signal generation with reinforcement learning and…
Many forms of dependence manifest themselves over time, with behavior of variables in dynamical systems as a paradigmatic example. This paper studies temporal dependence in dynamical systems from a logical perspective, by enriching a…
This paper presents a distributed communication model to investigate multistable perception, where a stimulus gives rise to multiple competing perceptual interpretations. We formalize stable perception as consensus achieved through…
In this paper we apply the techniques of symbolic dynamics to the analysis of a labor market which shows large volatility in employment flows. In a recent paper, Bhattacharya and Bunzel \cite{BB} have found that the discrete time version of…
The use of persistently exciting data has recently been popularized in the context of data-driven analysis and control. Such data have been used to assess system theoretic properties and to construct control laws, without using a system…
Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient,…