Related papers: Partial Altruism is Worse than Complete Selfishnes…
Traffic congestion represents a complex urban phenomenon that has been the subject of extensive research employing various modeling techniques grounded in the principles of physics and molecular theory. Although factors such as road design,…
We investigate a traffic assignment problem on a transportation network, considering both the demands of individual drivers and of a large fleet controlled by a central operator (minimizing the fleet's average travel time). We formulate…
The travel costs of the players (travelers) in anonymous congestion games depend on their choices of routes and also on the states of the transportation network such as incidents, weather, and road work. In this extended abstract, we…
A central question in routing games has been to establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question is well understood in two classes of routing games. The…
The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the social cost of decentralized decisions and that of a centrally…
In multi-hop ad hoc networks, selfish nodes may unduly acquire high quality of service (QoS) by assigning higher priority to source packets and lower priority to transit packets. Such traffic remapping attacks (TRAs) are cheap to launch,…
In this note we consider the following problem to study the effect of malicious players on the social optimum in load balancing games: Consider two players SOC and MAL controlling (1-f) and f fraction of the flow in a load balancing game.…
Traditional non-atomic selfish routing games present some limitations in properly modeling road traffic. This paper introduces a novel type of non-atomic selfish routing game leveraging concepts from Daganzo's cell transmission model (CTM).…
We study the emergence of altruistic behaviour in collective games. In particular, we take into account Toral's version of collective Parrondo's paradoxical games, in which the redistribution of capital between agents, who can play…
We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of theory as well as real world data. First, we introduce a new type of games: $\theta$-free flow games. Here, commuters only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow…
We examine the routing problem for self-interested vehicles using stochastic decision strategies. By approximating the road latency functions and a non-linear variable transformation, we frame the problem as an aggregative game. We…
We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by having the player's utility costs to be determined by the…
This paper studies the monotonicity of equilibrium costs and equilibrium loads in nonatomic congestion games, in response to variations of the demands. The main goal is to identify conditions under which a paradoxical non-monotone behavior…
In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…
We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…
We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for linear congestion games. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor $\epsilon$. We…
In this work, we consider the problem of minimising the social cost in atomic congestion games. For this problem, we provide tight computational lower bounds along with taxation mechanisms yielding polynomial time algorithms with optimal…
To steer the behavior of selfish, resource-sharing agents in a socio-technical system towards the direction of higher efficiency, the system designer requires accurate models of both agent behaviors and the underlying system infrastructure.…
In this paper, we consider a heterogeneous traffic network with multiple users classes which differ considerably in their path selection objective. In particular, we consider two classes of users: ones who seek to minimize social cost…
We study a routing game in which one of the players unilaterally acts altruistically by taking into consideration the latency cost of other players as well as his own. By not playing selfishly, a player can not only improve the other…