Related papers: Partial Altruism is Worse than Complete Selfishnes…
We study assignment games in which jobs select machines, and in which certain pairs of jobs may conflict, which is to say they may incur an additional cost when they are both assigned to the same machine, beyond that associated with the…
In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…
We consider team zero-sum network congestion games with $n$ agents playing against $k$ interceptors over a graph $G$. The agents aim to minimize their collective cost of sending traffic over paths in $G$, which is an aggregation of edge…
We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This model encompasses several well-studied extensions of the classical Wardrop model which…
In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on…
In multiplayer games, self-interested behavior among the players can harm the social welfare. Tax mechanisms are a common method to alleviate this issue and induce socially optimal behavior. In this work, we take the initial step of…
Classical game theory is a powerful framework to analyze the strategic interactions among rational players. However, in many real-life scenarios, players choose actions based on their inherent natural tendencies rather than deliberate…
Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of subsidies and tolls in incentivizing user behavior in congestion games. The predominantly studied method of influencing user…
We consider the traffic assignment problem in nonatomic routing games where the players' cost functions may be subject to random fluctuations (e.g., weather disturbances, perturbations in the underlying network, etc.). We tackle this…
When people pick routes to minimize their travel time, the total experienced delay, or social cost, may be significantly greater than if people followed routes assigned to them by a social planner. This effect is accentuated when human…
Congestion games constitute an important class of non-cooperative games which was introduced by Rosenthal in 1973. In recent years, several extensions of these games were proposed to incorporate aspects that are not captured by the standard…
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We…
We ask if it is possible to positively influence social behavior with no risk of unintentionally incentivizing pathological behavior. In network routing problems, if network traffic is composed of many individual agents, it is known that…
When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…
In this work we propose a macroscopic model for studying routing on networks shared between human-driven and autonomous vehicles that captures the effects of autonomous vehicles forming platoons. We use this to study inefficiency due to…
How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing.…
Recent work on decision making and planning for autonomous driving has made use of game theoretic methods to model interaction between agents. We demonstrate that methods based on the Stackelberg game formulation of this problem are…
We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to…
Semi-cooperative behaviors are intrinsic properties of human drivers and should be considered for autonomous driving. In addition, new autonomous planners can consider the social value orientation (SVO) of human drivers to generate…
Road network junctions, such as merges and diverges, often act as bottlenecks that initiate and exacerbate congestion. More complex junction configurations lead to more complex driver behaviors, resulting in aggregate congestion patterns…