Related papers: Partial Altruism is Worse than Complete Selfishnes…

When traffic is routed through a network that is susceptible to congestion, the self-interested decisions made by individual users do not, in general, produce the optimal flow. This discrepancy is quantified by the so-called "price of…

One common assumption in game theory is that any player optimizes a utility function that takes into account only its own payoff. However, it has long been observed that in real life players may adopt an altruistic or even spiteful…

Highway on-ramps are regarded as typical bottlenecks in transportation networks. In previous work, mainline vehicles' selfish lane choice behavior at on-ramps is studied and regarded as one cause leading to on-ramp inefficiency. When…

Selfish routing is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, with one of the principal applications being that of routing in road networks. Inspired by the emergence of routing technologies and autonomous driving, we revisit selfish…

The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…

Traffic congestion games abstract away from the costs of junctions in transport networks, yet, in urban environments, these often impact journey times significantly. In this paper we equip congestion games with traffic lights, modelled as…

We study the equilibrium behavior in a multi-commodity selfish routing game with many types of uncertain users where each user over- or under-estimates their congestion costs by a multiplicative factor. Surprisingly, we find that…

We put forward a new model of congestion games where agents have uncertainty over the routes used by other agents. We take a non-probabilistic approach, assuming that each agent knows that the number of agents using an edge is within a…

In congestion games, selfish users behave myopically to crowd to the shortest paths, and the social planner designs mechanisms to regulate such selfish routing through information or payment incentives. However, such mechanism design…

The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. Motivated by this, this paper presents…

Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…

Routing games are one of the most successful domains of application of game theory. It is well understood that simple dynamics converge to equilibria, whose performance is nearly optimal regardless of the size of the network or the number…

We study {\em bottleneck routing games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their…

We investigate the price of anarchy (PoA) in non-atomic congestion games when the total demand $T$ gets very large. First results in this direction have recently been obtained by \cite{Colini2016On, Colini2017WINE, Colini2017arxiv} for…

Atomic congestion games are a classic topic in network design, routing, and algorithmic game theory, and are capable of modeling congestion and flow optimization tasks in various application areas. While both the price of anarchy for such…

Typically, autonomous cars optimize for a combination of safety, efficiency, and driving quality. But as we get better at this optimization, we start seeing behavior go from too conservative to too aggressive. The car's behavior exposes the…

Despite the advances in the autonomous driving domain, autonomous vehicles (AVs) are still inefficient and limited in terms of cooperating with each other or coordinating with vehicles operated by humans. A group of autonomous and…

In order to drive effectively, a driver must be aware of how they can expect other vehicles' behaviour to be affected by their decisions, and also how they are expected to behave by other drivers. One common family of methods for addressing…

The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case…

Routing games are amongst the most well studied domains of game theory. How relevant are these pen-and-paper calculations to understanding the reality of everyday traffic routing? We focus on a semantically rich dataset that captures…