Related papers: Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…

We introduce the notion of logical A-games for a fairly general class of algebras A of real truth-values. This concept generalizes the Boolean games of Harrenstein et al. as well as the recently defined Lukasiewicz games of Marchioni and…

Although logit quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) offers a natural equilibrium selection mechanism and converges to Nash equilibrium as the rationality parameter tends to infinity, its computation in extensive-form games is generally…

The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…

This paper presents a new primal-dual method for computing an equilibrium of generalized (continuous) Nash game (referred to as generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP)) where each player's feasible strategy set depends on the other…

Congestion games offer a primary model in the study of pure Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games, and a number of generalized models have been proposed in the literature. One line of generalization includes weighted congestion games, in…

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic…

Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…

In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…

We consider a game in which the action set of each player is uncountable, and show that, from weak assumptions on the common prior, any mixed strategy has an approximately equivalent pure strategy. The assumption of this result can be…

Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

We introduce language-based games, a generalization of psychological games [6] that can also capture reference-dependent preferences [7]. The idea is to extend the domain of the utility function to situations, maximal consistent sets in…

Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the…

The Nash Equilibrium is a much discussed, deceptively complex, method for the analysis of non-cooperative games. If one reads many of the commonly available definitions the description of the Nash Equilibrium is deceptively simple in…

We consider existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in an $N$-player game of utility maximization under relative performance criteria of multiplicative form in complete semimartingale markets. For a large class of players' utility…

We study constrained bi-matrix games, with a particular focus on low-rank games. Our main contribution is a framework that reduces low-rank games to smaller, equivalent constrained games, along with a necessary and sufficient condition for…

We present efficient approximation algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in anonymous games, that is, games in which the players utilities, though different, do not differentiate between other players. Our results pertain to such games…

Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…