Representing Strategic Games and Their Equilibria in Many-Valued Logics
Logic
2016-01-05 v1
Abstract
We introduce the notion of logical A-games for a fairly general class of algebras A of real truth-values. This concept generalizes the Boolean games of Harrenstein et al. as well as the recently defined Lukasiewicz games of Marchioni and Wooldridge. We demonstrate that a wide range of strategic n-player games can be represented as logical A-games. Moreover we show how to construct, under rather general conditions, propositional formulas in the language of A that correspond to pure and mixed Nash equilibria of logical A-games.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1601.00408,
title = {Representing Strategic Games and Their Equilibria in Many-Valued Logics},
author = {Libor Běhounek and Petr Cintula and Chris Fermüller and Tomáš Kroupa},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1601.00408},
year = {2016}
}
Comments
Accepted to Logic Journal of the IGPL