Bayesian Games with Intentions
Computer Science and Game Theory
2016-06-27 v1
Abstract
We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian games with intentions, generalizing both Bayesian games and psychological games, and prove that Nash equilibria in psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1606.07519,
title = {Bayesian Games with Intentions},
author = {Adam Bjorndahl and Joseph Y. Halpern and Rafael Pass},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.07519},
year = {2016}
}
Comments
In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.07295