Related papers: Rational Consensus
We analyse the typical structure of games in terms of the connectivity properties of their best-response graphs. Our central result shows that, among games that are `generic' (without indifferences) and that have a pure Nash equilibrium,…
The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we propose that if agents report messages to the designer through channels (e.g., Internet), agents can construct a self-enforcing agreement such…
Learning by experience in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) is a difficult and exciting task, due to the lack of stationarity of the environment, whose dynamics evolves as the population learns. In order to design scalable algorithms for systems…
In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents in a coevolutionary model for actions and opinions. In the model, the individuals of a population interact on a two-layer network, sharing their…
Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…
Multiagent learning is a necessary yet challenging problem as multiagent systems become more prevalent and environments become more dynamic. Much of the groundbreaking work in this area draws on notable results from game theory, in…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
Successfully attaining consensus in the absence of a centralized coordinator is a fundamental problem in distributed multi-agent systems. We analyze progress in the Synod consensus protocol -- which does not assume a unique leader -- under…
We study a mean field game in continuous time over a finite horizon, T, where the state of each agent is binary and where players base their strategic decisions on two, possibly competing, factors: the willingness to align with the majority…
Systems of competing agents can often be modeled as games. Assuming rationality, the most likely outcomes are given by an equilibrium (e.g. a Nash equilibrium). In many practical settings, games are influenced by context, i.e. additional…
Correctness is an emergent property of systems where exposing error is cheaper than committing it. In dynamic, low-trust environments, autonomous AI agents benefit from delegating work to sub-agents, yet correctness cannot be assured…
We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In this dynamics, a belief estimate of the parameter is repeatedly updated given players' strategies and realized…
This paper studies an $N$--agent cost-coupled game where the agents are connected via an unreliable capacity constrained network. Each agent receives state information over that network which loses packets with probability $p$. A Base…
Network games provide a framework to study strategic decision making processes that are governed by structured interdependencies among agents. However, existing models do not account for environments in which agents simultaneously interact…
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile resilient to unilateral deviations, and is predominantly used in the analysis of multiagent systems. A downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet,…
Collective phenomena in systems of interacting agents have helped us understand diverse social, ecological and biological observations. The corresponding explanations are challenged by incorrect information processing. In particular, the…
How humans make decisions in non-cooperative strategic interactions is a challenging question. For the fundamental model system of Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game, classic game theory of infinite rationality predicts the Nash equilibrium…
Self-stabilization is an excellent approach for adding fault tolerance to a distributed multi-agent system. However, two properties of self-stabilization theory, convergence and closure, may not be satisfied if agents are selfish. To…
Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the problem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the…
Is it rational for selfish individuals to cooperate? The conventional answer based on analysis of games such as the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) is that it is not, even though mutual cooperation results in a better outcome for all. This…