Related papers: Rational Consensus
Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work, we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
Many algorithms have been proposed in prior literature to guarantee resilient multi-agent consensus in the presence of adversarial attacks or faults. The majority of prior work present excellent results that focus on discrete-time or…
A continuous-opinion model accounting for the social compromise propensity is theoretically and numerically analysed. An agent's opinion is represented by a real number that can be changed through social interactions with her neighbours.…
When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a…
We discuss a natural game of competition and solve the corresponding mean field game with \emph{common noise} when agents' rewards are \emph{rank dependent}. We use this solution to provide an approximate Nash equilibrium for the finite…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice…
We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…
We consider the problem of multi-agent consensus where some agents are subject to faults/attacks and might make updates arbitrarily. The network consists of agents taking integer-valued (i.e., quantized) states under directed communication…
Game theory is usually considered applied mathematics, but a few game-theoretic results, such as Borel determinacy, were developed by mathematicians for mathematics in a broad sense. These results usually state determinacy, i.e. the…
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and…
The main approach to evaluating communication is by assessing how well it facilitates coordination. If two or more individuals can coordinate through communication, it is generally assumed that they understand one another. We investigate…
In repeated games, strategies are often evaluated by their ability to guarantee the performance of the single best action that is selected in hindsight, a property referred to as \emph{Hannan consistency}, or \emph{no-regret}. However, the…
Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…
In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…
Investors usually resort to financial advisors to improve their investment process until the point of complete delegation on investment decisions. Surely, financial advice is potentially a correcting factor in investment decisions but, in…
We propose a generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) built on a simple premise: some actions are more focal than others. In our model, which we call the Focal Quantal Response Equilibrium (Focal QRE), each player plays a…
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof. In view of this, we address…
We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium. We…